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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Carolyn Jaffe Andrew*
Abstractor

Civil Rights Act-Magee v. Williams, 329 F.2d
470 (7th Cir. 1964). Plaintiff, a Chicago police
officer, sued the Superintendent of Police of Chicago and seven Chicago policemen for damages
under the Civil Rights Act, alleging that while
acting under color of law, in their official capacities
as Chicago police officers, defendants conspired
to deprive and did deprive plaintiff of federal
constitutional and statutory rights, privileges and
immunities. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that
defendant Eubanks persuaded his superiors to
conspire against plaintiff as alleged above in order
to discredit plaintiff and make him less effective
in the matter of charges against Eubanks for which
plaintiff lawfully had arrested him, and that pursuant to the conspiracy defendant Williams speeded
a car on plaintiff's beat and, while using a hidden
recording device in violation of Illinois law, offered
him a bribe, which plaintiff refused. On appeal
from dismissal of his complaint by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, plaintiff contended that the complaint
alleged denial of Fourteenth Amendment protection, violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983, and a conspiracy to deny equal protection of the laws in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §1985(3), and that he did
not forfeit his basic constitutional rights by becoming a Chicago police officer and public servant.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed, holding that the Illinois electronic eavesdropping statute [ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 38, §§14-2 &
-4(1963)] was not violated, inasmuch as defendant
Williams consented to use of the device; and that
Williams' conduct toward plaintiff did not constitute attempted entrapment for which plaintiff
could conceivably maintain a cause of action, even
though the eavesdropping device was used, inasmuch as plaintiff said nothing in the recorded
conversation inconsistent with the faithful performance of his police duties. The Court noted
that the situation plaintiff complained of was one
incident in a general plan to determine which
police officers were dishonest as a basis for discharge, and that this plan obviously "would oper* LL.B., LL.M., Northwestern University School
of Law. Member Illinois Bar.

ate for the good of the public as well as every
honest police officer," and concluded, "Certainly
there is no federal law that a policeman be awarded
damages simply because he did his work honestly."
Confessions-Jackson v. Deno, 84 Sup. Ct.
1774 (1964). Petitioner was sentenced to death
on his conviction of murder in the New York
state courts, and the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed. On appeal from the Second Circuit's
affirmance of the U.S. District Court's denial of
his application for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner
contended that his conviction was invalid because
it was based upon a confession not properly determined to be voluntary. The United States Supreme Court, per Justice White, reversed and
remanded to the District Court to allow the State a
reasonable time to afford petitioner a hearing on
the issue of voluntariness or a new trial, in default
of which petitioner would be entitled to release.
The Court held unconstitutional the New York
rule, applied to petitioner's confession at the trial,
whereby the trial judge makes a preliminary determination regarding the voluntariness of a proffered confession, excluding it only if under no
circumstances it could be deemed voluntary, but
receiving it as evidence and alloving the jury to
determine its voluntariness if he finds the evidence
presents a fair question of voluntariness, with the
jury being told to consider the confession as evidence and to determine its credibility and weight
only if it finds the confession voluntary. The Court
held that this rule violated petitioner's fourteenth
amendment right to be free of a conviction based
upon a coerced confession, inasmuch as the jury
may have improperly considered factors relating
to truthfulness, such as evidence of guilt, in deciding the question of voluntariness, or, equally
unconstitutionally, the jury may have found the
confession involuntary but may in fact have been
consciously or unconsciously unable to disregard
it in determining the ultimate issue of guilt. In so
holding the Court expressly overruled Stein v.
New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), which had held
New York's procedure as described above not
violative of the fourteenth amendment. The ma-
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jority explained that Stein's underlying alternative
assumptions-that either (1) the jury properly
determined the facts bearing upon the issue of
voluntariness against the accused and properly
relied on the confession, or (2) the jury found the
contested facts in favor of the accused, deemed the
confession involuntary, and disregarded it in accordance with the trial court's instructions-failed
to take proper account of the dangers to an accused's rights. As to the first assumption, the Jackson majority decided that, since under the New
York rule the jury heard both the evidence bearing
on voluntariness and all the corroborative evidence
showing that the confession was true and that the
accused committed the crime, there was a serious
danger that the jury disregarded or disbelieved
Jackson's testimony pertaining to involuntariness
because it believed he was guilty and because the
jury was expressly told (consistently with the New
York rule) to determine the confession's truthfulness in assessing its probative value. Thus the
Stein assumption that the jury may have found the
confession voluntary under this procedure, said the
Jackson majority, was erroneous because there was
no assurance that the jury reliably determined the
facts in accordance with the constitutionally required test of voluntariness-regardless-of-truthfulness. The Jackson majority noted that the Stein
holding stemmed from the premise-since overruled by Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, abstracted at 52 J. Ciam. L., C. & P.S. 294 (1961)that the exclusion of involuntary confessions is
constitutionally required because of inherent untrustworthiness. As to Stein's second assumption,
the Court refused to believe that a jury can entirely
disregard a confession it believed to be true merely
because it found the confession to be involuntary.
The Court distinguished the disapproved "New
York rule" from both the "orthodox rule," under
which the trial judge is the sole judge of voluntariness and the jury passes only on the weight of confe~sios he decides are voluntary, and the "Massachusetts rule," whereby the jury determines both
voluntariness and weight only after the trial judge
has resolved the voluntariness issue against the accused.
Justice Black concurred in part and dissented in
part, stating that in his opinion the confession in
question was involuntary because of "inherently
coercive circumstances," and thus he would reverse and remand, releasing petitioner from custody unless the state retried him within a reasonable time. In that part of Black's opinion in which

Justice Clark joined, justice Black was of the
opinion that the majority's ruling was based on the
erroneous conclusion that any state procedure it
believed unfair was therefore unconstitutional,
and that the instant decision, in finding the New
York jury determination "tainted by inherent
unreliability," undermined the Constitution's
draftsmen's implicit belief in the soundness of the
jury system.
In his separate dissent, justice Clark would not
have considered the issue because of petitioner's
failure to attack the constitutionality of New
York's procedure in the state courts, and further
stated, "If I am in error on this, then I join my
Brother Harlan. His dissent is unanswerable."
justice Harlan dissented in an opinion in which
Justices Clark and Stewart joined. Harlan stated
that the majority's decision rested on a rationale
of jury incompetence which in effect condemned
the jury system generally, noting that the Court
has consistently, and, in Harlan's opinion, correctly, rejected that rationale in recent cases, even
in one tried in the federal courts [Delli Paoli v.
United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957)], over which
the Court's supervisory authority is much broader
than its authority to dictate state procedures.
Justice Harlan stated, "Limitations on the States'
exercise of their responsibility to prevent criminal
conduct should be imposed only where it is demonstrable that their own adjustment of the competing
interests infringes rights fundamental to decent
society. The New York rule now held unconstitutional is surely not of that character."
[The majority opinion and Black's opinion contain appendices listing decisions of states and
federal circuits according to which procedures of
determining confession voluntariness are followed.]
Confessions-Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d
535 (5th Cir. 1964). Defendant was convicted of
forging a U.S. Government check. On appeal,
defendant contended that his confession and handwriting sample were improperly received in evidence, inasmuch as they were obtained during a
period of unnecessary delay in violation of FED. R.
CR. P. 5(a), and because they were the product
of his illegal arrest. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, per Wisdom, J., affirmed, holding
that where the first hour of delay after defendant's
arrest by state officers and booking on state charges
was devoted to apprehending his confederate, one
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Swallow, attempts were begun as soon as Swallow
was in custody to reach the U.S. Commissioner,
who did not have regular office hours, for arraignment on the federal charge, and the federal arraignment was held two or three hours thereafter,
it was proper to interrogate defendant between
arrest and federal arraignment so long as none of
his rights was abused, inasmuch as the delay was
for legitimate police purposes rather than for the
impermissible purpose of seeking to elicit a confession; that consequently, defendant was not
detained in violation of Rule 5(a), so his confession
and handwriting sample were not inadmissible on
that ground; that the arresting Secret Service agent
possessed information (consisting of knowledge
that forgery had been committed, information
from a source known by him to be reliable that
Swallow implicated defendant in the crime, information from a detective that defendant had
been convicted of forgery, and knowledge that
Swallow had dosed his place of business and disappeared) sufficient to constitute probable cause to
arrest defendant without a warrant; but even assuming arguendo that defendant's arrest was illegal,
there was sufficient evidence of defendant's "freedom of mind," where defendant's arrest was not
surrounded by "oppressive circumstances," three
hours elapsed between arrest and confession, and
interrogation was non-continuous, to conclude
that his confession and handwriting sample were
the product of an intervening act of free will so
that any illegality involved in the arrest did not
taint the voluntarily given evidence or render it
inadmissible under the rule of Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, abstracted at 54 J. CRIm. L.,
C. & P.S. 189 (1963).
Double Jeopardy-United States v. Tateo, 84
Sup. Ct. 1587 (1964). Defendant was convicted
on four counts relating to federal bank robbery.
In a §2255 proceeding, another district judge
granted defendant's motion to set aside the judgment on the ground that defendant's pleas of
guilty on the fourth day of his jury trial were
coerced. When defendant was then re-indicted
on a kidnaping charge that had been dismissed
when he pleaded guilty to the four bank robbery
charges and on those four counts, a third district
judge, before whom defendant was to be retried,
granted his motions for dismissal of all counts on
grounds of double jeopardy. On direct appeal by
the Government [which had then abandoned the
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kidnaping count] pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3731,
defendant contended that where during the course
of a jury trial he had pleaded guilty under coercion
of the trial judge's threats of extreme sentences if
found guilty by the jury, his retrial constituted
double jeopardy, and that his retrial should not
be allowed on the rationale that an accused found
guilty by a jury whose conviction is later reversed
at his instance for trial error can be retried without
being put in double jeopardy, inasmuch as defendant's situation was distinguishable on the
ground that his involuntary plea of guilty deprived
him of the opportunity to obtain a jury verdict of
acquittal. In an opinion written by Justice Harlan,
the United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded to the District Court with instructions
to reinstate the four bank robbery counts, holding
that it is well settled that the fifth amendments
double jeopardy provision does not preclude retrial
of a defendant whose conviction is set aside because
of an error leading to conviction; that it was irrelevant in applying this principle whether the
original conviction was overturned in collateral or
direct proceedings; and, in answer to defendant's
argument that his case must be distinguished from
those in which defendants found guilty by a jury
may be constitutionally retried after reversal,
that defendant was no more wronged by failure to
get a jury verdict than one who was found guilty
by a jury in a trial at which error was committed;
and consequently defendant could be retried
without being placed in double jeopardy. The
Court noted that Downumr v.United States, 372
U.S. 734, abstracted at 54 J.CRm. L., C. & P.S.
494 (1963), was not inconsistent with the instant
decision. The Court concluded that defendant's
case was squarely within the reasoning of United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), and subsequent
cases allowing the Government to retry persons
whose convictions have been overturned and
justified the permissibility of retrial not on any
technical legal theory, but rather on the basis of
the "implications of the [Ball] principle for the
sound administration of justice." The majority
reasoned that society's clear interest in punishing
the guilty would be undermined if every accused
were granted immunity from subsequent prosecution because of any reversible error in the original
trial and further stated that the Ball rule allowing
retrial serves defendants' rights as well as society's
interest, inasmuch as "it is at least doubtful that
appellate courts would be as zealous as they now
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are in protecting against the effects of improprieties at the trial or pretrial stage if they knew
that reversal of a conviction would put the accused
irrevocably beyond the reach of further prosecution."
Justice Goldberg, with whom Justices Black and
Douglas joined, dissented, stating that the majority improperly limits the Downunt case, supra,
since just as Downum was deprived of his constitutional right to be tried by the impaneled jury
because of prosecutorial neglect, Tateo was deprived of this right by reason of the trial court's
threat which produced the admittedly coerced
pleas of guilty.

Obscenity-acobellis v. Ohio, 84 Sup. Ct. 1676
(1964). Defendant was convicted of possessing and
exhibiting an obscene film, and the Ohio intermediate appellate and supreme courts affirmed.
On appeal, defendant contended that the movie
"The Lovers" was not obscene when tested, as it
must be, against national as opposed to local
community standards. In an opinion by Justice
Brennan, in which Justice Goldberg joined, announcing the judgment of the Court, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
film was not obscene, and that consequently, defendant's conviction violated his first amendment
rights. Stating, "It is, after all, a national Constitution we are expounding," Justice Brennan's
Entrapment-Uniled States ex rel.Hall v. Illinois, opinion declared that the standard to be applied
329 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1964). Petitioner was con- must be a national rather than a local community
victed of unlawful sale and possession of narcotics standard, since the alternative would result in the
in the Illinois state courts, the Illinois Supreme same material being constitutionally punishable in
Court affirmed, and the United States Supreme some areas but not in others. Justice White conCourt denied certiorari. On appeal from summary curred in the judgment without opinion. Justice
denial by the United States District Court for the Black's concurring opinion, joined by justice
Northern District of Illinois of his petition for writ Douglas, stated that any conviction for exhibiting
of habeas corpus, petitioner contended that free- a motion picture violates freedom of the press.
dom from entrapment is a right protected by the Justice Stewart, concurring, stated that criminal
due process clause and thus was properly raised in laws in this area are constitutionally limited to
his federal habeas corpus petition, and that the hard-core pornography, which may be difficult
Illinois courts erred as a matter of law in holding to define, "But I know it when I see it .... "
he had not been entrapped. Noting that this was a Justices Warren, Clark, and Harlan dissented,
case of first impression in the federal courts on the being of the opinion that the State's determination
constitutional issue, the Court of Appeals for the of obscenity was supported by sufficient evidence,
Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that petitioner's not irrational, and not unconstitutional.
contentions attempting to analogize entrapment
[This case is somewhat unusual in that the Court
to the exclusionary rules concerning unlawful actually viewed the entire film before passing judgsearch and seizure and coerced confessions were ment, thus carrying to the. utmost its articulated
fallacious, since state and federal cases evidenced rule that it has a responsibility independently to
that the states have used the same standards of determine facts of constitutional magnitude.]
entrapment as have the federal courts and have
afforded accuseds the unfettered protection of the
Right to Counsel-Escobedo v. Illinois, 84 Sup.
doctrine of entrapment when the facts establish Ct. 1758 (1964). Petitioner was convicted of
murder, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.
that a crime was induced by law enforcement
officials; that where the several states have thus People v. .&cobedo, 190 N.E.2d 825, abstracted at
consistently discharged their responsibility to 54 J. CmRp.L., C. & P.S. 492 (1963). On certiorari,
society in giving full recognition of their constitu- petitioner contended that since his incriminating
tional obligation to prevent lawless enforcement of statement was obtained after the police refused to
the criminal law-as the states have done in the allow him to consult with his attorney, use of the
area of entrapment-the need for federal interven- statement as evidence at his trial violated his
tion is "not apparent"; and consequently, peti- right to due process of law. The United States
tioner's claim that the Illinois courts' determina- Supreme Court, per Justice Goldberg, reversed and
tion of his entrapment defense was invalid did not remanded, holding that even though petitioner
constitute a claim of deprivation of a federally had not then been indicted, the adversary system
guaranteed right raisable on petition for writ of had begun to operate-and thus petitioner's right
to counsel arose-as of when the investigation
habeas corpus.
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ceased to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and began to focus on petitioner for the
purpose of obtaining a confession; that police
refusal of petitioner's requests to see his retained
counsel, who was in the building where petitioner
was being held, coupled with their continuing to
interrogate him without advising him of his absolute right to remain silent, constituted deprivation
of petitioner's right to counsel; and therefore the
statement elicited from petitioner during this
interrogation could not constitutionally be used
against him. Discussing the historical and philosophical foundations for its decision, the majority
opinion stated that "a system of criminal enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confession'
will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than one which depends on extrinsic
evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation," and that "no system of criminal
justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens'
abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should
have to fear that if an accused is permitted to
consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of,
and exercise, those rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a
system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system." The Court
also noted that Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433 (1958), and Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504
(1958), were distinguishable on the ground that in
Escobedo petitioner was not informed of his right
to remain silent, but that to the extent that those
cases were inconsistent with Escobedo they were
no longer controlling.
Justices Harlan, Stewart, White, and Clark dissented, all of the opinion that the majority's decision would unjustifiably and seriously fetter
legitimate methods of law enforcement. Justices
White, Clark, and Stewart deplored what they
regard as an inevftable though not yet decided
corollary to Escobedo-that indigents must have
counsel at some accusatorial pre-indictment stage
-as unworkable "unless police cars are equipped
with public defenders ......

Right to Counsel-Massiahv. United States, 84
Sup. Ct. 1199 (1964). Petitioner was convicted of
federal narcotics offenses, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62
(2d Cir. 1962), abstracted at 54 J. Clrm. L., C. &
P.S. 77 (1963). On certiorari, petitioner contended
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that where a radio transmitter was installed in
co-defendant Colson's car by Government Agent
Murphy, with Colson's consent, Murphy's testimony regarding incriminating statements petitioner made while, unaware that the transmitter
was sending the conversation to Murphy's receiving device some distance away, petitioner
voluntarily engaged in a conversation with Colson
in the car, should not have been used against him
at the trial, inasmuch as use of the radio equipment violated his fourth amendment rights, and,
alternatively, because use against him of the
statements elicited from him by Government
agents after indictment and in the absence of
retained counsel violated petitioner's fifth and
sixth amendment rights. Noting that the fourth
amendment issue was not reached, the United
States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Stewart, reversed, holding that petitioner
was denied the basic protections of the sixth
amendment when evidence of his incriminating
statements, which federal agents had deliberately
elicited from him after he had been indicted and
in the absence of his counsel, was used against
him at his trial. "Fourth Amendment problems
to one side," the Court accepted and, for present
purposes, approved, the Government's argument
that the agents were justified in making use of
Colson's cooperation by having him continue his
normal associations, and stated that it was "entirely proper to continue an investigation of the
suspected criminal activities of... [petitioner]
and his alleged confederates, even though...
[petitioner] had already been indicted."
Justice White dissented in an opinion in which
Justices Clark and Harlan joined, stating that if
Colson had had no prior arrangements with the
police and had gone to the police after his conversation with petitioner, his testimony regarding
petitioner's statements, as well as a recording he
might have made, would be admissible, whereas
because of Colson's prior cooperation with the
government, "both his evidence and the recorded
conversation are somehow transformed into inadmissible evidence despite the fact that the
hazard to Massiah remains precisely the samethe defection of a confederate in crime." The dissenters were unable to see how under the facts of
this case petitioner's right to counsel was infringed, and they believed the majority was unjustified in formulating a rule requiring exclusion
of voluntary statements in the absence of any
facts, objective evidence, or reasons to warrant

19641
"scrapping"
this area.
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the voluntary-involuntary test in

Search and Seizure-Aguilar v. Texas, 84 Sup.
Ct. 1509 (1964). Petitioner was convicted of illegal
possession of heroin by the Texas state courts, and
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals [the highest
Texas court hearing appeals of criminal cases]
affirmed. On certiorari, petitioner [apparently]
contended that evidence obtained pursuant to a
constitutionally defective warrant was used against
him at the trial. The United States Supreme Court,
per Justice Goldberg, reversed and remanded,
holding that the standard for obtaining a search
warrant was the same under the fourth and fourteenth amendments [citing Ker v. California, 347
U.S. 23, abstracted at 54 J. Cpm. L., C. & P.S.
488 (1963), as authority for this holding, while
noting that Ker itself involved a search without a
warrant]; that since the fourth amendment's
protection prefers the informed and deliberate
judicial determinations of a magistrate issuing a
warrant to actions without warrants based upon a
police officer's determination of probable cause,
a reviewing court examining the validity of a
search warrant based upon a neutral magistrate's
determination of probable cause will accept evidence of a less judicially competent or persuasive
character than that which would be required to
justify a police officer acting without a warrant,
and will sustain the judicial determination of probable cause so long as it rested upon a substantial
basis; and where the search warrant in question
had been issued on the affidavit of two police
officers, which stated, inter alia, that "affiants
have received reliable information from a credible
person and do believe [that narcotics were being
unlawfully kept on the described premises]," and
set forth neither any underlying circumstances
from which affiants' undisclosed informant concluded that narcotics were where he claimed they
were nor any underlying circumstances from which
the officers concluded that the informer was
"credible" or his information "reliable," the
affidavit did not provide a sufficient basis for the
magistrate's finding of probable cause; and consequently, the warrant was constitutionally invalid,
and the evidence obtained thereunder should not
have been admitted against petitioner.
In a dissenting opinion written by justice Clark,
in which Justices Black and Stewart joined, these
Justices stated that they would affirm on the
ground that since the affiants made a sworn state-

ment that they had received reliable information
from a credible informer, and the officers did not
make the affidavit nor obtain the warrant until
after they had undertaken a week-long surveillance
of the premises, the affidavit did not constitute a
mere "conclusion" or "suspicion" insufficient to
justify the finding of probable cause requisite to
issuance of a valid warrant. [It should be noted
that the officers' surveillance of the premises
covered by the warrant, which was disclosed on
petitioner's motion to suppress below, was not
mentioned in the affidavit and thus was irrelevant
to disposition of the instant case, inasmuch as in
passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing
court may consider only information brought to
the magistrate's attention. While the majority
does not treat this issue in the text of its opinion,
the above statement is a paraphrase of its footnote
1.]
Search and Seizure-Presley v. Pepersack, 228
F. Supp. 95 (D. Md. 1964). After petitioner was
convicted of rape and sentenced to death, the
Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Petitioner's application for state post-conviction
relief was denied, and the Maryland Court of
Appeals denied leave to appeal. On petition for
writ of habeas corpus, petitioner contended that
illegally seized evidence was admitted against
him at the trial, that involuntary confessions were
used against him, that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel, and that the prosecuting
authorities suppressed alibi evidence favorable to
him. The United States District Court for the
District of Maryland ordered that the writ issue
in 30 days unless the State should retry petitioner
or seek appellate review of this decision, holding
that where, after petitioner was taken to the police
station, his apartment was searched without a
warrant, without his consent, and in the absence
of any exceptional circumstances obviating the
necessity of either, the search was in violation of
petitioner's constitutional rights; and consequently, since illegally seized tangible items and
testimony concerning certain other illegally seized
tangible items were introduced against petitioner
at the trial, and the jury was not precluded from
considering this evidence, petitioner was convicted in violation of his constitutional rights,
and habeas corpus must issue subject to the State's
opportunity to seek appellate review or to retry
petitioner. The Court noted that petitioner's
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suppression of exonerating evidence point was
rendered moot by this decision, inasmuch as the
suppressed information would now be available
to petitioner for purposes of possible retrial. In
view of its decision to issue the writ on the search
and seizure ground, the Court declined to consider petitioner's confession and counsel contentions, stating, "It is more appropriate in the
interest of comity that the courts of the State of
Maryland be the first to consider the petitioner's
contentions as they have been changed by later
cases ....

"

Search and Seizure--Uited States v. Poppitt,
227 F. Supp. 73 (D. Del. 1964). Defendants,
charged with accepting wagers without payment
of tax, moved to suppress evidence, contending
that the warrant under which their home was
searched failed to describe the premises with
sufficient particularity, and that the warrant was
executed in violation of 18 U.S.C. §3109. The
District Court for the District of Delaware denied
the motion, holding that where the affidavit on
which the warrant was issued did particularly
describe the property to be searched, characterizing it as a one-family dwelling, whereas actually
defendants lived in the first floor and basement
while the second floor was an apartment rented by
three men unconnected with the charges against
defendants, the question of description was really
a question of probable cause; that where the
affidavit set forth probable cause to believe, inter
alia, that the house was a one-family dwellinge.g., the affidavit stated that a deed to the premises
was recorded in defendants' names, that the
building was a one-family dwelling-and the
Commissioner had no reason to believe anyone
other than defendants lived therein, the warrant
was properly issued to search the whole house; and
since the affiant himself had reasonable grounds
to believe the house was a one-family dwelling,
and the second floor of the house was not searched,
the evidence obtained under the properly issued
warrant was admissible even though it was later
disclosed that the warrant applied to premises in
addition to those actually occupied by defendants.
With regard to defendants' alternative contention
that the officers unlawfully broke into the house
in executing the warrant, the Court held that
although the officers did "break in" when they
pushed open an unlocked but dosed screen door
and entered through the already opened permanent door, this conduct was not in violation of
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§1309, inasmuch as they waited 15 seconds after
knocking, announcing their authority and purpose,
and receiving no response thereto before they
broke in.
Self-Incrimination-Malloy v. Hogan, 84 Sup.
Ct. 1489 (1964). Petitioner was convicted of contempt by a Connecticut state court for refusing
to answer questions in a state gambling inquiry,
and the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
affirmed. On certiorari, petitioner contended that
he was privileged not to answer the questions by
virtue of the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause, which guaranteed him the protection of the
fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Noting that "the Court has not hesitated
to re-examine past decisions according the Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in the preservation of basic liberties than that which was contemplated by its Framers when they added the
Amendment to our constitutional scheme" [citing
as examples Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925), where the Court reversed its previous position that the first amendment was not applicable
to the states through the fourteenth; Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, abstracted at 52 J. Cjm~. L.,
C. & P.S. 292 (1961), where the Court reversed
its prior holding that the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule was merely a rule of evidence not
binding on the states as part of due process; and
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, abstracted at
54 J. CRn. L., C. & P.S. 193 (1963), where the
Court reversed its holding that the sixth amendment's right to counsel was not applicable to the
states], the United States Supreme Court, per
Justice Brennan, reversed, holding that "the Fifth
Amendment's exception from compulsory selfincrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against abridgment by the States";
that the privilege was available to petitioner in
the statutory inquiry even though he was not then
a defendant in a criminal prosecution; and since
it was evident from the implications of each of the
questions asked which petitioner refused to answer
together with the setting in which it was asked
that an answer or an explanation why it could not
be answered could result in the disclosure of incriminating evidence, petitioner's claim of privilege
was properly asserted, and his privilege was unconstitutionally abridged by his contempt conviction. In reaching its conclusion, the Court
noted that United States Supreme Court cases
forbidding the use of coerced confessions in state
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criminal cases and Mapp v. Ohio's language concerning the fifth amendment's interrelationship
with the fourth had already undermined and
repudiated Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908), and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947), which were overruled by the instant decision. The Court further held that the same
standard which determines the validity of a claim
of privilege asserted in a federal proceeding must
be applied in a State proceeding, citing first amendment, search and seizure, and right to counsel
cases as exemplary of the prior application of uniform standards in constitutional areas.
Justices Harlan and Clark dissented in an
opinion written by the former, stating that due
process prohibits a state, as the fifth amendment
prohibits the federal government, from imprisoning
a person solely because he refuses to give testimony which may incriminate him under state law;
but Harlan and Clark disagreed with the Court's
"incorporation" of the fifth amendment, together
with the whole body of federal case law surrounding the privilege as directed against the federal
government, into fourteenth amendment due
process, stating that under our system of federalism, which should recognize relevant differences existing between state and federal criminal
law enforcement, compelled uniformity of standards between state and federal assertion of a
federally guaranteed right was ill-advised. They
would have applied in this case-as they have
advocated in all such cases-a test of fundamental
fairness to determine to what degree, if any, the
fifth amendment must be held applicable to the
states.
Justice Stewart joined in Justice White's dissent, stating that petitioner failed adequately to
assert the privilege in the instant case, and criticizing the majority's resort to speculation to hold
that the questions asked petitioner were liable to
result in incriminating answers or explanations.
Justices Harlan and Clark agreed that the privilege
had not properly been invoked. [Although Stewart
and White did not express their agreement with
the majority's basic holding that the fifth amendment applies to the states, the fact that they discussed the validity of petitioner's invocation of the
privilege without expressing disagreement with
that holding indicates their tacit agreement.]
Mr. Justice Douglas joined in the Court's
opinion while expressly stating that he adheres to
his concurrence in Gideon. [In that concurrence,
Douglas had stated that the entire Bill of Rights

applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The precise holding of Gideon involved a
state felony charge. The Justices agreeing with
the entire majority opinion in Malloy (Brennan,
Goldberg, Warren, and Black) and Justice Douglas
presumably agree with Brennan's statement in
the majority opinion (at 1495) that the fourteenth
amendment guarantees a state defendant the
same sixth amendment right to counsel as that
afforded a federal defendant-i.e., five of the nine
Justices now agree that state defendants have a
federal constitutional right to counsel in all state
criminal cases, including those charging only minor
misdeameanors.]
Self-Incrimination-Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 84 Sup. Ct. 1594 (1964). Petitioners were
held in civil and criminal contempt of court for
refusing to testify at a hearing of the New York
Harbor Waterfront Commission (a New YorkNew Jersey joint entity) after being granted
immunity from prosecution under the laws of
New York and New Jersey. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the criminal convictions on
procedural grounds, but affirmed the civil contempt judgments. On certiorari, petitioners contended that their answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law, to which the grant
of immunity did not purport to extend. In an
opinion written by Justice Goldberg, the United
States Supreme Court sustained the judgment
ordering petitioners to answer the questions, but
vacated and remanded the contempt judgments to
the New Jersey Supreme Court to afford petitioners
an opportunity, in light of the instant decision, to
answer the questions. The Court held that since
the fifth amendment now applies to state as well as
federal criminal proceedings, citing Malloy v.
Hogan, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964), abstracted supra,
all the prior cases [discussed at length in the
opinion] which would dictate that there was no
constitutional objection to one sovereign's use in a
criminal prosecution of testimony compelled by
another sovereign, and which rested on the rule
rejected by Malloy, were similarly rejected; that
there was therefore "no continuing vitality to, nor
historical justification for, the rule that one jurisdiction within our federal structure may compel a
witness to give testimony which could be used to
convict him of a crime in another jurisdiction";
and consequently, "the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination protects a state witness
against incrimination under federal as well as state
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law and a federal witness against incrimination
under state as well as federal law." As to the instant decision's effect upon existing state immunity legislation, the Court further held that in
light of its holding that the privilege against selfincrimination protects a state witness from
federal prosecution, and Malloy's holding that the
same standards must be applied to determine the
validity of invocation of the privilege in either a
state or federal proceeding, "the constitutional
rule... [is] that a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the testimony and its
fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal
officials in connection with a criminal prosecution
against him." The majority concluded that "'to
implement this constitutional rule and accomodate the interests of the State and Federal Governments in investigating and prosecuting crime, the
Federal Government must be prohibited from
making any such use of compelled testimony and
its fruits." The Court noted that this exclusionary
rule, while permitting the states to secure necessary
information, leaves the witness and the federal,
government in substantially the same position as
if the witness had successfully claimed his privilege
in state proceedings in the absence of a state grant
of immunity. The Court's order sustaining the
state court judgment ordering petitioners to
answer the questions but vacating and remanding
the contempt judgments to allow petitioners an
opportunity to answer was based upon the premises that the Murphy holding dictates that no use
can be made in a federal criminal prosecution
against petitioners of their state-compelled immunized testimony, and that at the time petitioners
refused to answer they had a reasonable fear,
based on Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487
(1944) (overruled by the instant decision), that
their state immunized testimony could be used
against them in a subsequent federal prosecution.
In a concurring opinion by Justice White, with
whom justice Stewart joined, White stated why
the majority's exclusionary rule-whether viewed
as an exercise of the Court's supervisory power
over federal law enforcement or a constitutionally
compelled rule-was both necessary and desirable.
[The majority opinion had concluded the rule
would be adopted without further discussion than
that abstracted above.] The concurring Justices
also emphasized that once a federal criminal defendant shows that he was compelled by a state
to give testimony, he can nonetheless be prosecuted
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by the federal government for activities relating
to his testimony so long as the Government can
demonstrate that its evidence against the defendant is independent of and untainted by the
compelled testimony. [The majority had also made
this point, but in a footnote.]
Justice Harlan, in a separate opinion in which
Justice Clark joined, concurred in the judgment
solely on the ground that testimony compelled in
a state proceeding should'ntt be used in a federal
criminal trial on the basis of a supervisory rule of
exclusion, stating that, in their opinion, the
majority's holding requiring such exclusion erroneously rests on constitutional grounds. These
Justices adopt a supervisory, power' exclusionary
rule because it is "protective of the values which
the federal privilege aginst self-incrimination expresses, without in any way interfering with the
independent action of the States and the Federal
Government in their respective spheres," rather
than in reliance on Malloy.
[It should be noted that, while the facts of the
instant case concern only the possible incrimination under federal law of a witness compelled to
testify in a state proceeding, and the newly
adopted exclusionary rule deals only with that
situation, the majority's broad statements, which
are characterized in the language of the opinion
itself as "holdings," also include the reverse situation-involving possible incrimination under state
law brought about by federally compelled testimony. If the majority's exclusionary rule is merely
a supervisory power rule of evidence, then it is an
open question how to protect from subsequent
state prosecution a witness whose testimony is
sought to be compelled in a federal proceeding; if
the rule is constitutionally compelled, then the
corollary rule will doubtless be applied to the
states in a situation where state-incriminating
testimony has been federally compelled. As mentioned above, the majority fails expressly to state
which of these alternatives is its basis for the rule.]
Self-Incrimination-Wild v. Brewer, 329 F.2d
924 (9th Cir. 1964). Albert J. Wild, President of
Air Conditioning Supply Co., was ordered by the
United States District Court for the District of
Arizona, on application of one Brewer, an agent of
the Secretary of the Treasury, to appear before the
Court and produce certain records of the corporation which he had refused to produce as required
by a summons served against him as president of
the corporation by Brewer in connection with an

19641

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES

investigation of the corporation's tax liability. On
appeal from the court order, Wild contended that
he was privileged not to produce the books and
records of the corporation of which he was the sole
shareholder and director, inasmuch as these items
would tend to incriminate him under federal
criminal law. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit set aside the order appealed from and remanded to the District Court with a direction to
dismiss Brewer's application, holding that although
a corporation has no privilege against self-incrimination, and although ordinarily an officer of a
corporation who, in his capacity as officer, has
custody of corporate records, cannot successfully
refuse to produce those records in response to a
subpoena issued to the corporation and served
upon him as custodian, on the ground that the
records contain material which would incriminate
him, that rule would not apply to Wild, since the
reasons justifying the rule-that a corporation is
an impersonal embodiment of the group interests
of its constituents, and that shareholders have a
right not to be damaged by their officer's suppression of records which he holds only as a custodian
for them-did not apply to his situation, since as
sole shareholder of the corporation, the corporation
embodied his interest alone, and no one but himself
could be affected by what he did with the corporation; and consequently, Wild was entitled to assert
his personal privilege against self-incrimination as
to the corporate records sought. The Court noted
that the instant decision extended the privilege
"beyond the borders marked by the precedents ..... " One judge dissented.
Self-Incrimination-United States v. Fleisl,
227 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. Mich. 1964). Defendant
was convicted in 1939 on 14 counts of violations of
the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§5841,
5854(b), & 5851 [§§3261(b), 3263(b), & 2726(a) of
the 1939 Code, under which defendant was convicted], and was sentenced to six consecutive
five year sentences on one count of failing to pay
a required tax and five counts of failing to register.
Defendant was never sentenced on the remaining
eight counts. On motion to vacate sentence, defendant contended that the registration provision
of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §5841, is
unconstitutional as violative of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The
United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan vacated the sentence and
ordered defendant's release, holding that since

anyone who complies with the registration requirement of §5841 necessarily admits that he is in
illegal possession of a firearm, that section violates
the privilege against self-incrimination [relying on
Rmssell v. United States, 306 F.2d 402 (9th Cir.
1962)]; and since defendant had already served
20 years, only five of which were supported by a
valid conviction, he must be released, even though
there were convictions on eight counts which
could support the 30 year sentence imposed,
inasmuch as no sentence had been imposed on
those counts, and to impose sentence now on those
1939 convictions would violate FEm. R. Cmdx. P.
32(a)'s requirement of imposing sentence without
unreasonable delay. Noting that the United States
Supreme Court has never declared a registration
statute violative of the fifth amendment, the
District Court quoted language in several United
States Supreme Court decisions lending support to
the instant decision. The gambling stamp cases
were distinguished on the ground that, while in
those cases one must register an intention to commit a crime, in the Firearms Act each registrant
declares not an intention but current criminal
activity.
Wiretapping-Standing To Object-UnitedStates
v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1964). Defendant,
a union official, was indicted for unlawfully receiving money from an employer. The District Court
for the Eastern District of New York granted defendant's motion to suppress proffered testimony
and dismissed the indictment on the ground that
it had resulted from an illegal wiretap. On appeal
by the Government, defendant moved to dismiss
for lack of appellate jurisdiction and contended
that the trial court properly ruled that the proffered testimony could not be used and correctly
dismissed the indictment, inasmuch as the proffered testimony and the indictment were the
product of a wiretap in violation of §605 of the
Federal Communications Act. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied defendant's
motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that since
the order dismissing the indictment was appealable
under 18 U.S.C. §3731, the order suppressing evidence, though not appealable standing alone, was
appealable where it was coupled with the dismissal,
and where the basis of dismissal of the indictment
was inextricably intertwined with the basis of the
suppression order. The Court affirmed the lower
court's judgment, holding that defendant had

